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Chapter one: Introduction
Citizens of western liberal states have a large range of effectively enforced rights. They can live
their lives free and according to their own will. Children and adolescents are educated, artists and
writers are  supposed to be free to express their opinions, and religious groups are  supposed to be
free to practice and spread their religion within society. Liberal states protect these rights and they
refrain from imposing values and beliefs on citizens. They are indifferent about how these rights are
used.  Whether a citizen wants to be a devout Christian with a strong sense of community or an
atheist urban liberal is unimportant.
Within these liberal states there are however also orthodox and traditional social groups. Some of
these  cultures consider women subordinate to men.  Within their social environment women  from
these social groups are treated unequally. Women may formally have equal rights and opportunities
within liberal states; but not all women decide to use their rights. Some women deliberately choose
to live their lives in accordance with their traditional values and beliefs. Such traditions can demand
that their freedom and opportunities are restricted. These women therefore decide for example only
to do domestic work, to raise the children, and to be obedient to their husbands or fathers.
These women  are a challenge  for liberalism. The fundamental principles underlying many liberal
theories are equality of rights for all citizens and neutrality of the state about the way in which these
rights are used. This equality and neutrality should ensure that people are free to choose to live their
lives in accordance with their own conception of a meaningful and good life. Within these theories
the choice of these women from traditional social groups is thus perfectly justified. Proponents of
liberal  neutrality  defend  the  argument that  these  women  have inalienable  civil  rights,  but  they
however may decide to  not  use their  rights.  They can decide to  live their  lives not  freely and
autonomously. 
I find this consequence of liberal neutrality slightly paradoxical. On the one hand equality in rights
and state neutrality should enable people to be free and autonomous; it can on the other hand lead to
a society in which some people are evidently not autonomous or free. I think that this consequence
of liberal neutrality is problematic. In this thesis I will defend the following claim: 
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The freedom of  individuals is insufficiently protected within a state which is neutral towards the
different conceptions of the good life in society. 
This is a controversial claim to defend, because it implies that a state should not always be neutral.
Theories  of  liberal  neutrality  are a  response  to  centuries  of  religious  violence,  oppression  of
minorities and brutal tyrannies. With an appeal to the (one and only true) good terrible injustices
have been inflicted by states on people who held different ideas about the good life. The recognition
that societies are plural and that states should not enforce a particular conception of the good has
undoubtedly been a blessing for many minority groups. A defense of any comprehensive political
doctrine must thus be wary not to pave the way for all sorts of paternalism and oppression. 
I do however not wish to defend such a comprehensive political doctrine in this thesis. I will also
not try to formulate specific policies which might be necessary to effectively guarantee the freedom
of individuals. The goals of my thesis are more modest. My main aim will be to show that states, in
order to protect the freedom of their citizens, should protect their personal autonomy. I further think
that this is not possible if the state is neutral about the different conceptions of the good life within
society.
In  this  thesis  women  from traditional  cultures,  as  described  previously,  will  form  the central
example. In chapter 5, I will use their case to support the claim that a neutral state does not succeed
to guarantee the autonomy of individuals. Also in other parts of this thesis many references to it will
be made. I would like to stress that I aim to defend  the claim that  the freedom of  individuals in
general is not guaranteed in a neutral state, and not the claim that just  the autonomy of women is
insufficiently protected.  The problem that these women pose to the neutral state  merely forms a
telling and contemporary example. It is however not unlikely that similar examples of the failure of
neutral states to guarantee personal autonomy of individuals exist. I would secondly like to stress
that I will not argue that certain social groups need additional or group-related rights to promote
their personal autonomy. Such an argument has been made by Kymlicka (1995) and Young (1989)
for example. I will defend the claim that every individual in society has an equal right to personal
autonomy, regardless whether they are  for example women, members of a religious minority  or
homosexuals. States are obliged to foster the personal autonomy of all their citizens. 
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I will proceed my argument as follows. In the next chapter I will firstly explain my position in two
major debates. I will describe the difference between teleological and deontological theories. I will
secondly discuss the difference between objective and subjective theories about the good. I will
then make my own position in these debate explicit. 
In chapter  three I will defend a particular conception of freedom. I believe that  being free entails
more than simply having the possibility to  fulfill one's desires. I will argue  that, based on earlier
literature, more is needed for individuals to be truly free. My main argument will be that individuals
should also have personal autonomy.  
In chapter  four I will discuss the concept of liberal neutrality. The concept has been explained in
surprisingly many ways. I will firstly discuss the scope of  issues about which the state  should be
neutral.  Should a  state  only be  neutral  about  the  good or  also about  the right  or  controversial
empirical  claims?  I  will  secondly  discuss  how  the  state  should  be  neutral.  I  will  explain the
distinction between neutrality of effects, neutrality of justification and neutrality of intention. I will
argue that neutrality of effects is an indefensible concept of neutrality. Subsequently, I think it is not
fair to criticize proponents of liberal neutrality on the fact that a neutral state will not have neutral
effects on society. I think  that neutrality of justification is a more viable  approach. Finally, I  will
discuss some different arguments in favor of neutrality. 
In chapter five I will  defend  the claim that liberal neutrality is not the best way to guarantee the
freedom and personal autonomy of individuals. I will firstly discuss the theories of some authors,
most notably Ronald Dworkin, which hold that out of respect of individuals' autonomy the state
should remain neutral. I will argue that respecting the autonomy of individuals demands more than
a  neutral  state  can  provide.  I  will  support  this  claim  by  analyzing the  case  of  women  from
traditional societies. I will secondly argue that it is not impossible for a state to promote and foster
the autonomy of individuals. 
I  will  end  this thesis  with a  brief conclusion of  the major arguments.  I  will  also discuss some
limitations of this thesis and some questions and problems that it does not address. 
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Chapter two: Two debates in Political Philosophy
In this chapter I will discuss two important debates within political philosophy to which this thesis
is related. I believe that making my position within these debates explicit is crucial for a better
understanding of the following chapters.  
2.1. The Right and the Good
Within political philosophy a fundamental distinction is made between theories about the right and
theories  about  the  good.  Sidgwick  (1907,  p.  105) argued  that  this  distinction  was  the  major
difference between modern and classical philosophy. Rawls (1971) later argued that the right should
have priority over the good. In this section I will try to place this thesis in this larger philosophical
debate. 
Sidgwick distinguishes between imperative and attractive theories. Imperative theories try to define
what right human conduct should entail. Proponents of these theories defend the claim that there are
moral  dictates,  which  prescribe  certain  rules  independently  from any empirical  considerations.
Within these theories universal obligations and rights are formulated, to which individuals have to
comply in their everyday pursuit of a good life.  These theories are  a product of modern political
philosophy and focus on equal human rights and obligations. Attractive theories on the other hand
try  to  formulate  a  conception  of  the good.  Instead  of  providing  moral  obligations  and  rights,
proponents of these theories argue that a certain concept of the good life is worth pursuing for all
individuals.  Ancient  Greek philosophers tried to  define  such an ultimate good  life and  tried to
defend a certain concept of human flourishing. Utilitarianism is a modern example of an attractive
theory. Within this theory the good is defined as the minimization of pain and the maximization of
pleasure (Sidgwick 1907, p. 105-107).
In  a  Theory  of  Justice (1971) Rawls  argues  that  the  right  should  be  prior  to  the  good.  He
distinguishes between deontological and teleological theories.  Deontological theories either define
what is right independently from any conception of the good or  hold that the right is not derived
from a  particular  conception of the good.  A deontological theory defines moral obligations and
rights for individuals which are always prior to their own conceptions of the good. It defines, so to
say, the boundaries within which individuals are free to live in accordance with their conceptions of
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the good. Teleological theories on the other hand hold that the good is prior to the right. Rights are
dependent  on  a  conception of  the  good.  Instead  of  defining the  boundaries  within  which  the
different  conceptions of  the  good  in  society  might  be  pursued  by individuals,  rights  serve to
maximize the good. They are legitimate to the extent that they effectively promote this good. A law
that doesn't serve the ultimate good, is not legitimated and must be replaced (Rawls 1971, p. 30-33).
Rawls fears that teleological theories do not take individuals seriously as separate moral beings, but
as mere means to a higher end. Within these theories it is justified that an individual's happiness is
sacrificed in order to achieve or to maximize this higher good. The ends of individuals can be made
subordinate to the ends of society or some conception of the good.  Deontological theories  on the
other hand provide individuals with unalienable rights and the possibility to follow their own plans
in life.  Their goals in life are not treated as means to an end, and their personal goals cannot be
sacrificed  in  order  to  promote  the  good  of  society (Rawls  1971,  p.  29).  Rawls  defends  a
deontological theory of justice. He argues that the state should not make policies based on claims
about the superiority of a certain conception of the good. Although he is wary about using the term
neutrality, within his theory the state has to refrain for basing policies on the good. A state should
formulate what is right independently of it. It should decide what the boundaries are within which
the good might be pursued by individuals, regardless  of the conception of the good that a person
holds (Rawls 1988, p. 260-264).
 
The theory I will defend would clearly qualify as a teleological  theory according to Rawls. I will
argue in  favor of an ideal  of  the human flourishing:  namely the ideal that  people should  have
personal autonomy. The state should actively pursue policies which help people to govern their own
life. Rights and obligation are, in that sense, legitimate to the extent that they improve the personal
autonomy of people. I do not think that arguing in favor of this ideal of personal autonomy means
that the distinctiveness of individuals has to be jeopardized. I will defend this claim extensively in
chapter 5.1. For now I merely wish to clarify my own position. 
2.2. The Good: objective or subjective?
It is secondly important to discuss another distinction between two groups of theories,  which are
concerned with the question what a good life entails. The two groups differ in their opinion on the
question  whether  the  good is  entirely dependent  on  the  subjective  wants,  desires  and goals  of
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individuals or not.
Subjective theories about the good hold that what is good for individuals is ultimately dependent on
their states of mind.  What is good for individuals is solely determined  on the basis of their own
judgment about it. There are many different ways in which these theories are worked out. It is, for
example, possible to consider a person's life good if he enjoys pleasurable experiences. According
to such theories, a person's life becomes better, if his senses are stimulated positively. Such a theory
would  be  very  hedonistic1. Less  extreme  subjective theories are  however  also  defensible.  For
example the theory that a person's life becomes better if his desires are fulfilled. Not the pleasurable
experiences of a person are crucial to determine his well-being, but the actual achievement of  a
person's goals in life. Other theories hold that a person's life can also be considered better if desires
are fulfilled which  a person would have,  if  he was better  informed or more rational.  Although
worked out very differently, all these theories share that the well-being  of individuals ultimately
depends on their own judgment  about it (Sher  1997,  p. 6-8; Arneson 1999,  p.   115-117).  I would
also like to stress that these theories are not necessarily skeptical about our ability to know about the
good. They do not argue that we cannot know about the good, but simply that the good is dependent
on individuals' own judgment about it and that what is good can be different for every individual (R.
Dworkin 1978, p. 142-143).
Proponents of objective theories about the good argue that some things in life, some values or some
personal traits are inherently good to have as humans, regardless whether individuals actually desire
to have them (Sher  1997,  p.  6-8).  This category of theories is extremely broad and houses  many
different, and often incompatible, theories. What these inherently good things for individuals are,
can be, and has been, interpreted in tremendously many ways. Some will argue that traditional
family values or historical social institutions are inherently valuable and good for individuals, while
others will argue that the absence of pain and the maximization of welfare are inherently valuable.
Arneson  (2003,  p.  37) defends  a  list  of  objectively worthwhile  and good things in  life  which
include: meaningful work, intellectual achievement and good relationships with friends and family.
1 Hedonistic theories have been criticized fiercely, most notably by Nozick (1974, p. 42-43). He argues that if a theory 
holds that only pleasurable experiences are necessary to have a good life, it would lead to very counterintuitive 
conclusions. He asks us to imagine a machine which brings people in very deep sleep, but at the same time gives these 
sleeping people a maximum of pleasurable experiences. According to hedonistic theories, people who are hooked to 
such a machine would have a perfect life. However, being in such a vegetative state all day, however pleasurable, 
doesn't seems to grasp our intuitions about a truly good life. For that reason, not many will defend that experiences are 
central to well-being, but the actual fulfillment of desires in the 'real' world. 
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These objective theories will also differ in the extent that they consider the actual desires, values
and goals of individuals of importance. Not many will argue that what a good life entails, is entirely
independent from the actual desires and goals of individuals. It would be very hard to defend the
claim that Peter's life objectively cannot become any better, while none of his actual desires and
goals are fulfilled or achieved. He has everything that is considered objectively good, but is at the
same time frustrated and depressed about his failure to achieve his subjective desires and goals. For
this reason proponents of objective theories will have to take the subjective desires of individuals
very seriously. This also means that these theories do not necessarily have to hold that only one way
of life is  ultimately the best.  Proponents of objective theories can either  consider two or more
incommensurable ways of life objectively valuable or can defend the view that the good is partly
dependent on the subjective desires and goals of individuals (Arneson 1999, p. 115-117; Sher 1997,
p. 6-8).
Subjectivists about the good have  a strong  motive to defend liberal neutrality. If an individual's
well-being is  ultimately dependent on his  own desires, it would be logical to  argue that the state
should refrain  as much as possible  from influencing them. A person himself will know best what
desires and goals he wishes to pursue. A state isn't capable of, or is ineffective in, promoting certain
goals  and desires  in  society.  Everybody desires  different  things and therefore  the  state  remain
neutral. It doesn't however automatically follow that subjectivists are neutralists. Similarly it doesn't
follow that objectivists will always be in favor of nonneutral policies and laws. Although arguing
that some things in life are objectively  valuable, they can for example  find that imposing  these
things will  be ineffective.  Or  they can think that neutrality is  favorable  for another reason,  for
example a stable society (Sher 1997, p. 8-10).
I favor an objectivist theory of the good. I believe that personal autonomy is objectively valuable,
regardless whether individuals actually desire to be autonomous. This doesn't mean that I find the
subjective wants and desires of individuals of no importance. On the contrary, people undeniably
have different ideas about what a worthwhile life is and undeniably pursue different goals. I think it
is crucial for an individual's well-being that he can follow his own  life plan  and can fulfill his
subjective  wants. The  concept  of  personal  autonomy  I  will  defend  leaves  enough  room  for
individuals  to have, and fulfill, such desires and goals. I do however think that desires  and goals
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formed in an autonomous way are inherently better than those which are accepted blindly or which
are the result of social pressure.  
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Chapter three: True Freedom
3.1. Two intuitions 
In  this  chapter  I  will  try  to  define  when  an  individual  can  be  considered  free.  Freedom is  a
controversial and a much discussed concept within political philosophy. Freedom appears to be a
quite straightforward concept. Based on our intuitions we seem capable of determining whether
somebody is evidently free or not. For example: A slave is clearly not a free man. However clear
our initial intuitions about freedom might be, it has proven extremely hard to define the concept of
freedom in an uncontroversial and meaningful way within political philosophy. A lot of ink has been
spilled on the many nuances and aspects of the concept of freedom. It has proven even harder to
define the sufficient and necessary conditions  of it. In this chapter I will however try to defend a
particular set of such conditions.
A basic intuition seems to be that a person is free if he is capable of doing what he wants and is not
restricted in the fulfillment of his desires. A woman is free for example if she can decide freely
whom she wants to marry and whom not.  By contrast, a woman who is forced by her family to
marry a man they find suitable for her is not free. A woman is thus free, if she can do what she
desires.
Being capable of doing what one desires, doesn't seem to capture all our intuitions about freedom.
The woman in the example of the prearranged marriage might actually not feel forced to marry this
man. Because she wants to live in accordance with the dictates of her culture, her actual desire
might be to marry this family-chosen man. She is most probably formed and conditioned by her
social environment and therefore she might not feel forced or deprived of her freedom at all. Is this
woman free? Based on the earlier intuition our answer must be yes. In this case she is namely free
to do what she desires. But this answer doesn't seem to be totally satisfying. Shouldn't we ask to
what extent this is what she “truly” desires? Or to what extent this desire  was the result of social
pressure and indoctrination? Did she really have, and could she comprehend that she in fact had, a
choice?
These questions are about personal autonomy. We do not only demand that people can do what they
want, but we also want to know whether  their desires are “truly” and “genuinely” theirs. People
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should to some extent be able to govern their own lives and their desires should not be completely
determined by external factors, however “happy” people might be in such situations. 
In the following sections I will develop these intuitions in greater detail in order to define certain
conditions of freedom in the last section. I think it is undeniable that individuals not only need the
freedom to do what they want, but also to some extent need to have control over their own lives. 
3.2.  Personal autonomy and freedom
It is useful to discuss a distinction which  has been made in the literature between the concept  of
personal autonomy and the concept of freedom.   
Gerald Dworkin argues that there is a difference between freedom and personal autonomy. He sees
freedom as the ability to fulfill a desire in a certain situation.  In a temporal  state of affairs in the
world some external forces can make the achievement of a desire either possible or impossible for
an individual. If it is possible for an individual to fulfill his desire he is free and if he is not capable
of doing so he is not free.  Dworkin defines freedom as the freedom to act in the world. Personal
autonomy on the other hand is a capability of individuals. It entails the ability to be self-governing.
It is  the  cognitive ability to govern one's desires in accordance with  one's own higher ideals  and
values.  An  individual  can  be  autonomous  independently  of  his  freedom  to  act  in  the  world.
Dworkin uses Odysseus as an example. Odysseus wanted to hear the song of the Sirens without
being lured in their trap. He tied himself to the ship and ordered his men not to release him during
the songs of the Sirens. Although being heavily restricted in his freedom during this time, his choice
to listen to Sirens' songs and being tied to the ship were both autonomous choices (G. Dworkin
1981, p. 210-211).  
Christman  and Anderson also  argue  that  there  is  a  difference  between personal  autonomy and
freedom.  They see freedom as a triadic relation between an  agent who is  free  to satisfy a certain
desire2. Freedom is measured by looking at the possibility that a person has to act in the world. If a
person is constrained in the fulfillment of many of his desires, he is considered not (or not very)
free. If he is however free to fulfill most of his desires, he is free (or freer). Personal autonomy on
the other  hand is  a  person's  capability to  form desires  autonomously.  They both disagree  with
2 This triadic relation between an agent, an obstacle and his desire has been firstly formulated by MacCallum in his 
famous article Negative and Positive freedom (1967). It not only provides a very helpful insight in the concept of 
freedom, but also in the different ways that freedom has be defined. 
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Dworkin that personal autonomy is a trait of individuals, but argue that it is  a trait of individuals'
desires. A desire is formed autonomously if it  is critically reflected on and endorsed by a person's
higher goals and beliefs.  The extent to which a person is autonomous depends on the amount of
autonomously formed  desires  he  has.  An  individual  is  never  fully  autonomous  or  entirely  not
autonomous, but he is always autonomous to a  higher or lower degree. (Christman 1991, p. 2-4;
Anderson 2008, p. 7-9).
I  think  that  the  distinction  made  by Dworkin,  Christman and Anderson is  clarifying.  Personal
autonomy is clearly different from freedom of action. For the sake of clarity it is very important to
keep both concepts apart. I also agree with the claim that freedom is not a sufficient condition for
personal autonomy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, personal autonomy entails more than
doing what one wants. Christman (1991, p. 22) and Dworkin (1981, p. 211) however also argue that
freedom is not a necessary condition of personal autonomy either. They believe that it is possible
that a person lacks freedom, but is still autonomous. I have serious doubts about that claim and will
return to this specific issue in section 3.7.  
3.3. Moral autonomy and personal autonomy
Within the literature an important second distinction is made between personal autonomy and moral
autonomy. Although the concepts are related and to some extent overlap, most authors stress their
differences (Raz 1986, p. 370; Christman 1988, p. 114-116).
Moral autonomy is a concept connected with Kantian ethics. A person is morally autonomous if he
acts rightly and is motivated by these moral laws independently of any empirical inclinations and
desires. It is a rational capability to reflect on the different ends of all people in society and to
construct  a  system  of  rights  in  which  all  these  different  pursuits  of  good  life are  regulated.
According to Kant, this was only possible if people could abstract from their own conceptions of
the good and their own personal traits, desires and wishes. Rawls' veil of ignorance is derived from
this concept of moral autonomy (Waldron 2005, p 307-314).
Personal autonomy is on the other hand the capability to govern one's own desires. It is the ability to
govern one's own life based on one's own values and beliefs. It holds that a person who drifts
through  life  without  any guidance  from a  general life  plan  is  not  autonomous.  Also  personal
autonomy requires that an individual can abstract from his desires and can critically reflect on them.
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He should reflect whether his desires are coherent with his goals, values and ideals in life. This is
however an individual process.  It is concerned with one's own life and  is not a way of thinking
about moral law for society (Waldron 2005,  p. 307-308, 314-320). 
Moral autonomy and personal autonomy share the idea that individuals should abstract from their
desires and inclinations and critically reflect on them in the light of a higher ideal (Waldron 2005, p.
317-319).  The reason why this  reflection  is  needed is  however fundamentally  different.  Moral
autonomy is  concerned  with  the  establishment  of  moral  law  and  personal  autonomy with  the
government  of  one's  own life.  In  the  following  chapters I  will  be  exclusively concerned  with
personal autonomy. The central topic of this thesis is the ability of individuals to govern their own
life. Although moral autonomy is a related and interesting subject, it goes beyond the scope of this
thesis to discuss this difficult it fully. 
3.4. The authenticity of desires
In his  famous  article  Frankfurt  defended  the  claim that  what  distinguishes  humans  from other
species is their capability of living their lives guided by their free will. Based on Frankfurt's work
Gerald Dworkin (1976, p. 23) later defended this concept of free will as personal autonomy. It
provides  a  theoretical  defense  of  the  intuition  that  a  human  life  consists  in  more  than  simply
satisfying desires and pursuing urges (Frankfurt 1971, p. 5-8).
Central  in  these  concepts  is  the authenticity of  desires.  People do not  only have desires  to  do
something, but they also have desires about their desires to do something. A person can have an
urge to smoke cigarettes for instance, but he could also have a desire not to be addicted to nicotine
anymore. He might consider such dependence on nicotine a weakness of his will or find the health
risks of smoking  too troublesome. The latter is a desire about a desire: it  is an evaluation of a
person's current desire in the light of his higher ideals and values. It is a reflection on a desire based
on how a person sees himself (Frankfurt 1971, p. 10, G. Dworkin 1976, p. 23-24). 
An individual has personal autonomy if he has this capability to critically reflect on his desires. An
autonomous agent critically evaluates his desires in the light of his own values, goals and ideals. He
deliberates on the question whether his desires are authentic and serve his goals in life (G. Dworkin
1976, p. 24-25 and 1981, p. 212). In other words, an autonomous individual tries to find out if his
desires are his own or the result of unwanted external  forces. Based on this judgment he either
 13
affirms or rejects a desire. Frankfurt describes this as a process of evaluating first-order desires and
inclinations based on second-order values, ideals and goals in life.  It is a hierarchical structure3.
Somebody who fails to do this is not autonomous or a “wanton”. He is only driven by his first-order
inclinations, urges and desires. He fails to reflect on them or is indifferent of their source. He drifts
through life without meaning (Frankfurt 1971, p. 10-14).
It  is  not  necessary  that  a  person  succeeds  in  removing  externally  imposed desires.  Dworkin
acknowledges that desires are formed through influences of people's social environment, family and
education.  People  undeniably  have  a  personal  history  of  externally imposed  desires.  What  is
essential is whether a person can affirm these desires later as his own. He should be able to identify
with his current desires, regardless of their origins (G. Dworkin 1976, p. 23-24). It is also possible
that a person considers a desire incoherent with his second-order goals and values, but is unable to
alter them. Dworkin gives an example of a  robbed man. He has an externally imposed desire to
hand over the money to the robber, because he would otherwise get killed. It is impossible to alter
this  desire,  but this  man is  still  autonomous (G. Dworkin  1981, p.  210-211).  Frankfurt  gives a
similar  example  of  an  unwilling  drugs  addict.  A drugs  addict  might  be  unable  to  alter  his
overwhelming desire for drugs. But if he is still able to consider his desire for drugs as unwanted
and incoherent with his plans in life, he should still be considered autonomous (Frankfurt 1971, p.
10-14). 
3.5. Are desires hierarchical?
The 'hierarchical' structure of first-order desires and inclination, and second-order values and beliefs
has been criticized within the literature. Thalberg for instance thinks that the role of second-order
values, beliefs and goals is overestimated. The robbed man for example will not be frustrated over
the fact that he has an externally imposed desire to hand over the money, but simply over the fact
that he feels coerced to act. He thinks that a better conception of coercion needs to be formulated
and that  second-order  desires  are  unnecessary  to explain  when a  person is  autonomous  or  not
(Thalberg 1978, p. 215-218). 
3. The term hierarchical is borrowed from other literature on this subject, most notably Christman (1988). The term is however 
somewhat misleading. It implies that the second-order values, beliefs and goals are superior, or more important, than first-order urges
and desires. I however do not want to give that impression. First-order desires, and their fulfillment are extremely important in a 
person's life. They are however less abstract than a person's values and beliefs and in that sense 'lower' desires. I will discuss it more 
extensively in section 3.5. I owe this insight to Nieuwenburg. 
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Friedman too is critical about the 'hierarchical' concept of autonomy. She thinks this hierarchy is not
as definite as Dworkin seems to defend. She  argues that frustration about a first-order desire can
lead to a complete alteration of one's second-order beliefs and values. A woman who is extremely
frustrated over doing the dishes and cleaning up the mess of her lazy husband, can, because of these
frustrations, decide to alter her second order values and ideals about traditional family roles entirely.
Friedman pleas for a bottom-up approach, in which the importance of second-order  values and
beliefs  are diminished and more weight is given to first-order desires. Central to her concept  of
personal autonomy is the argument that all second-order and first-order desires, values and beliefs
of an individual should be coherent with each other (Friedman 1986, p. 29-33). 
I find both these lines of critique  strong, but not compelling enough to abandon the  'hierarchical'
structure. It is true that first-order desires can have a large impact on one's life and should not be
underestimated.  Sometimes  frustrations  about  some  seemingly  straightforward  desires  or
inclinations can have radical  effects on someone's higher-order values and beliefs. It would also
sometimes be unnecessarily complicated to render an unwanted situation  of coercion,  such as a
robbery,  in terms of first-order desires and second-order goals in life. I do however think that  the
concept of personal autonomy is in its essence captured by Dworkin and Frankfurt. An autonomous
person governs4 his desires based on his own conception of a fulfilling and worthwhile life. 
3.6. The regress problem
Another  line  of  critique  against  Dworkin's  and  Frankfurt's  concepts  is  more  compelling  and
problematic. Many have argued that these second-order values and beliefs are just as vulnerable as
the  first-order  desires  and  inclination  for  unwanted  external  influences.  It  might  be  very well
possible that  a person's  second-order beliefs  and values are  the result  of social  conditioning or
indoctrination as well.  A much used example is that of a contented slave. It is not unlikely that
somebody, who has been a slave for a long time, finds his first-order desires,  for example to be
obedient and to serve his master unconditionally, completely coherent with his second-order beliefs
and values. He might have come to terms with his slavery or has been indoctrinated to believe that
this is simply his role in life. A less extreme case would be  that of women from very traditional
cultures,  whose  first-order  values  are that  they  have  to  be  obedient  and  subservient  to  their
husbands. These can however be completely coherent with their second-order religious values and
4 Again: the question whether somebody has personal autonomy as soon as he aims to govern his desires or only 
when he actually succeeds in doing so will be discussed in section 3.7.
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traditional ideas about family roles. In both cases it can be doubted whether these values and ideas
about slavery and the woman's place in society are formed autonomously (Christman 1987, p. 283-
286; Thalberg 1978, p.  219-225).
A person's second-order desires need to be formed autonomously as well or the hierarchical concept
would be radically incomplete (Christman 1991,  6-8).  It  is possible  to put second-order values
under the same scrutiny as first-order desires.  Individuals could critically reflect on  their second-
order values and beliefs based on some higher third-order ideals. But these third-order ideals would
face the same problem. Or as Anderson puts it: “If the authority or authenticity of any given desire
of order “n” is established by appeal to a desire “n+1” there seems to be no non-arbitrary stopping-
point to the regress (Anderson 2008, p. 10)”. This has been called the regress problem. 
There are two ways in which this regress problem has been dealt with in the literature. This  also
forms the difference between Dworkin's and Frankfurt's theory about autonomy (Anderson 2008, p.
11). Some have defended a structural approach to this problem. Frankfurt argues that an individual's
second-order values are autonomous if  he endorses them wholeheartedly. If a person doesn't have
any doubts about his second-order values and sees no reason to change them, these second-order
values should be considered autonomous (Anderson  2008, p. 13-15) Friedman defends a similar
concept of autonomy. Although she is critical about the difference between second-order and first-
order desires, she considers an individual autonomous if he considers all his desires to be coherent
with  each  other  (Friedman  1986,  p.  29-33).  Both  Friedman  and  Frankfurt  make  the  question
whether  somebody is  autonomous  thus entirely dependent  on the  subjective  states  of  mind  of
people. As long as somebody considers his second-order desires to be truly authentic and as long as
he can endorse them wholeheartedly, he should be considered autonomous.
I agree with both Christman (1987, p. 286-287) and Anderson (2008. 13-15) that this doesn't solve
the regress problem at all. A subservient housewife or a contented slave can be indoctrinated to such
an extent, or  be  so  dramatically uninformed,  that  they wholeheartedly endorse  their first-order
desires and second-order values and beliefs. The structural approach is too neutral about the reasons
of endorsement and is too subjective. An individual's own judgment about his autonomy, however
unconditionally defended by himself, is not sufficient to consider him autonomous. 
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The  second  approach  is  more  appealing.  Dworkin  argues  that  autonomy  not  only  requires
authenticity of desires, but also that the process of deciding whether a desire is authentic is done
independently: “The full formula for autonomy is then authenticity plus procedural independence. A
person is autonomous if he identifies with his desires, goals and values, and such identification is
not itself influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to himself
(Dworkin 1981 p. 212)”. Christman (1987, p. 287-292) argues that the process of critical reflection
should be free of illegitimate external influences. 
These accounts of procedural independence don't judge which  particular desires are autonomous
and which are not, but demand that desires are endorsed in a specific way. They are not concerned
with the content of a desire, but with the conditions under which desires are endorsed. Some ways
in which a desire is endorsed are considered not autonomous (Christman 1987, p. 292). The usual
suspects are brainwashing, indoctrination and threat. It might however be harder to formulate the
more subtle forms of  illegitimate external influences.  There  can be a thin line between fatherly
advice about a woman's choice of partner and a prearranged marriage  for example. It  however
provides an objective ground on which it can be judged whether a desire is autonomous or not.
Some reasons  for  endorsing  a  desire  will  simply not  do  for  personal  autonomy.  Defenders  of
procedural independence make some minimal demands of rationality  in the process of endorsing
desires (Sher 1997, p. 52-56).    
I find this demand of procedural independence a promising solution. Firstly because it leaves plenty
of room for individuals to have different goals, values and desires in life. It also solves the regress
problem by making some demands about the formation and endorsement of desires. It  demands
some rationality of the endorsement and considers some reasons for holding a desire not in line with
autonomy. A contented slave and a subservient woman will have to hold their desires for truly their
own  reasons.  All  forms  of  indoctrination  and  keeping  them  uniformed  will  make  them  less
autonomous. Independence is thus a crucial requirement of personal autonomy. 
3.7. Freedom as necessary condition of autonomy
The discussion up on this point was focused on the requirements of autonomy that are internal to
individuals. Christman and Dworkin consider individuals autonomous if they can critically reflect
on  their desires  in the light of their own values and beliefs independently from any illegitimate
influences. After this process of identification it is however not required that a person can actually
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effectively  alter  his  desires.  To  put  it  differently,  actual  freedom of  action  is  not  a  necessary
condition of personal autonomy (G.  Dworkin 1981, p. 210-211; Christman 1991, p.  22-24; Sher
1997, p. 48-51). 
Oshana is critical of these purely internal accounts of personal autonomy. She argues that somebody
is truly autonomous if he is in control  of his own life. This also means that a person should have
control over the external factors that reduce the control over his life. She defends the claim that a
person is  truly autonomous if  he  is  not  forced  to  act  in  the  interests of  others.  It  is  therefore
necessary that individuals have the immediate possibility to alter their desires if their personal goals
and values require this (Oshana 1998, p. 94-95). She gives an example of a woman who decides, in
accordance with the  internal requirements of autonomy, to lead a subservient life. She can have
decided that she is not capable of managing her own affairs and that being dependent on her man is,
all things considered, the best option. Oshana argues that this woman is not autonomous. She lacks
the power to decide for herself. She  thus cannot take immediate control over her own goals and
plans  (Oshana  1998,  p.  89-91).  The  same  would  be  true  for  the  drugs  addict,  who  lacks  the
capability to control his own desire for narcotics. 
A person can also be incapable to live in accordance with his own goals in life because of external
conditions.  Somebody can be constantly  incapable of fulfilling a  desire  or  achieving a  goal.  A
woman who  lives  her entire  life  in  extreme  poverty  and  who  has  to  spend all  her energy in
surviving,  will  not  be  capable  of  fulfilling  other  goals  in  life  she might  have.  In  order  to  be
autonomous, a person must be able to effectively act upon his desires. Haworth also points at the
risk of lacking the possibility to effectively pursue a desire. It can lead to the famous effect of the
sour grapes, as formulated by Jon Elster. Instead of being frustrated about the inability to fulfill a
certain desire, a person can also choose to stop having this desire or goal. This will make him feel
more happy, but leads to an alteration of his desires in accordance with his situation (Haworth 1991,
p. 134-138).     
Raz  too sees  the availability of  an adequate  range of  options  as  an indispensable  condition of
personal autonomy. A person can only be autonomous if he can choose between different options
which are not all totally trivial or all have enormous effects on a person's life. He should be able to
choose  between  various  and  sufficiently  different  options.  A person  should  be  able  to  pursue
multiple goals in his life and  should be able to alter them to something completely different. He
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further argues that these options should be morally acceptable. A person is not autonomous if he has
to choose between a bad option and good option. For example, if a person has an option between
marrying a woman or letting her get killed, he is not autonomous (Raz 1986, p. 373-381). 
I  think  Oshana,  Haworth  and  Raz  point  to a  weakness  of  the  internal  accounts  of  autonomy.
Autonomy seems to require that individuals to some extent have effective control over their lives. I
do not agree with Oshana that this control over one's life needs to be immediate and absolute. This
would mean that very few people could be considered autonomous. It leads to very counterintuitive
conclusions. Students for example would not be autonomous, because they are obliged to hand in
papers and  to do other school projects. They  thus cannot take immediate control over their life
plans. Many students will however consider their education beneficial for their personal autonomy.
It enables them to critically reflect on their goals and values in life.  I  therefore not entirely agree
with the claim that deliberately giving up control over one's ability to make autonomous decisions
always means giving up autonomy. A woman who decides to lead a subservient life or a man who
decides to join a very restrictive religious group do not automatically lack autonomy. Raz points at
the  crucial  criterion  for deciding  whether  somebody is  autonomous,  namely  the  possibility  of
changing one's  goals in life  later.  A decision must  not  be completely irreversible.  If  somebody
chooses a  way  of  life  this should  not  mean  that  all  other  options  are  from  that  moment  on
unavailable. A person should always, or at least after a reasonable amount of time, have an adequate
range of morally good options open to him. He should be able to alter his plans in life and start to
pursue equally reasonable goals. A certain degree of freedom of action is thus a necessary condition
of personal autonomy. 
3.8. An account of freedom 
What does freedom require? I have argued that freedom requires more than the ability to do what
one likes. Freedom of action is not a sufficient condition for a truly free life. An individual also
needs to be autonomous. I have however argued that in order to be autonomous it is also necessary
to  have  the  freedom to  act  on one's  desires,  goals  and values.  This  can  lead  to  the  following
conclusion about the question: when are individuals truly free? They can be considered free if and
only if the following three criteria are met:
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I. Individuals should be able to critically evaluate whether their desires and urges are coherent with
their higher goals, values and beliefs. They should be able to plan their life and have an idea about
what kind of person they want to be.
II. This process of critical evaluation should happen independent from unwanted external influences
and  manipulations.  Individuals should  endorse  their desires  based  on  reasons  which  are  not
illegitimately influenced.
III.  Individuals should  be  free  to  alter  their goals  in  life and have  an adequate range of  good
alternative options open to them. None of their decisions should definitely determine the course of
their lives. They should be free to act on their current desires and have the possibility to alter them
and form new and equally good desires.
These are in my opinion the criteria that should be met in order to consider an individual free.  It
seems to capture nicely the many intuitions we have about freedom. The conditions are quite similar
to  Raz' conditions  of  autonomy  (Raz  1986,  p. 371-373).  Concepts  of  freedom  are  always
controversial, but I hope  to have showed that freedom entails more than satisfying one's current
desires.  In  the  next  two  chapters  I  will  discuss  whether  a  neutral  state can  protect  personal
autonomy.  As mentioned in the introduction, women from traditional social groups will play an
important role in this discussion. Most notably, their case will be used to test whether a neutral state
can guarantee the personal autonomy of individuals in section 5.1.  
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Chapter four: Liberal Neutrality
In the previous chapter I have argued that individuals should not only be free to act, but also be able
to independently form higher goals, ideals and values in order to give meaning and guidance to their
lives.  They should  have  personal  autonomy.  Before  I  can  answer  whether  a  neutral  state  can
guarantee this, I will have to discuss the concept of liberal neutrality in more detail. I will firstly
discuss the scope of neutrality. On which issues should the state remain neutral? I will also discuss
whether state neutrality is merely a political doctrine. Secondly I will discuss how a state should be
neutral. What does the doctrine of neutrality demand of a state? How can it make neutral  policies
and laws? Finally I will briefly discuss some of the reasons why neutrality should be favored over
perfectionist theories according to proponents of liberal neutrality.
4.1. The scope of neutrality
It is  firstly necessary to establish on  what kind of issues neutrality  of the state is required.  It is
commonly argued that the state should be neutral on  questions about the good. The state is not
justified to promote conceptions of the good, but it can legitimately enforce rights. A state can also
legitimately defend that  certain  controversial  empirical  claims  are  true  and  can  decide  to base
policies on them. A state can, for example, teach children that natural selection or climate change
are true by means of public education. Arneson (2003, p. 5-6) wonders why the doctrine neutrality
should be limited to conceptions of the good. Why not also demand neutrality about conceptions of
the right or controversial empirical claims? I think Kukathas can be seen as a defender of such
generalized conception of neutrality. He argues that the liberty of conscience requires that people
are free to believe what they think is true, right and good. The state should therefore refrain from
imposing any of  its ideas about  what is  true,  right and good on their  citizens.  However,  many
proponents of liberal neutrality argue that the state should only refrain from promoting the good
(Kukathas 2003, p. 72 and p. 101-106). 
A more pressing issue is how we define what a conception of the good is. Larmore argues that
issues which are considered controversial within a society qualify as conceptions of the good. If, in
other words, a subject is a matter of fierce debate, which cannot be resolved by rational argument, it
is a conception of the good (Larmore 1987, p. 44-46). Both Arneson and Sher find this sociological
approach too weak and too strong at the same time. It is too weak because some ideas in society
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might not be controversial at all, but  can still  be considered a  conception of the good.  Within a
strictly Islamic country,  for example, there  might be consensus in society  about the idea that the
Islam is  the one and only true religion.  This  religion might  not  be controversial,  but  it  clearly
qualifies as part of a conception of the good.  Such a sociological approach is  thus vulnerable for
taboo and deep errors within a society. It is on the other hand too weak because it doesn't demand
that controversies are rational. Opponents can criticize a certain idea based on completely irrational
and incoherent arguments. Too many issues would form discussions about conceptions of the good
if any argument against a fact, right, or claim is considered valid. Both Arneson and Sher plea for a
more normative approach in order to establish whether a certain issue is about a conception of the
good life.  They consider an issue part  of a conception of the good if  no objective ground can
support either proponents or opponents of a certain claim. It can, in other words, not be resolved
based on rational  reasons,  for example empirical evidence or an objective ground such as public
health. Not the actual consensus in society, but the possibility of finding an objective reason to favor
one of the opposing opinions on a matter, should be determinate for deciding if an issue is about a
conception of the good  (Arneson  2003, p.  Sher  1997, p.  37-42).  I find this last approach more
compelling, whether an issue is about a conception of the good should be a normative question and
not an empirical one.  
A second question arises after our previous discussion. Who in society should be neutral about the
conceptions of the good? Many will argue that the principle of neutrality is solely a restriction of
state  policies.  Raz  and  Larmore  defend  such  a  view  for  example.  The  principle  of  neutrality
constrains the reasons for which a policy might be implemented by the state. The state should only
justify its policies based on the right or on other neutral grounds. For individuals in society such
restrictions do not exist. They might pursue and promote any conception of the good in their private
lives. Neutrality is thus only a political ideal (Raz 1986, p. 110-111; Larmore 1987, p. 46-48). 
Sher (1997, p. 28-30) and Arneson (2003, p. 5) question this claim. Sher stresses the fact that a state
and its organs consist of many individuals. These individuals create and execute the policies of the
state.  Also parliament and other legislative bodies consist of individuals. According to Larmore all
these individuals are in their personal lives free to promote and pursue any conception of the good,
but must refrain from doing so in their political function. According to Sher, this is, however, only
possible if civil servants and members of parliament to some extent see the value of state neutrality.
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These individuals should be motivated not to pursue their own conception of the good with their
political function. It is therefore necessary that these people as well are committed to the value of
state neutrality. Sher further argues that also the electorate should see the value of neutrality. He
thus doubts whether state neutrality is a purely political concept. It clearly needs the endorsement of
society, and in particular civil servants, in order to be effective. 
Although I think Sher's argument is valid and true, neutrality primarily seems to be a political ideal.
It holds that the state should  not use  its powers to promote a conception of the good in society.
Individuals  do  not  have  such  restraints  and  are  free  to  promote  and  pursue  their  particular
conceptions of the good. These individuals should however to some extent be able to endorse that
their state acts neutrally with regard to conceptions of the good.  
4.2. Neutral policies
Neutrality thus holds that  states should not try to promote  a conception of  the good in society. It
forms  a  restraint  on  state  policies.  But  how should  the  state  be  restrained?  What  policies  are
legitimate within a neutral state and which are not? Within the literature three different approaches
are suggested. By most authors, a distinction is made between two of these approaches. They argue
that  a state  can  either  aim  to  make  policies  that  are  neutral  in  their  effects on  the  different
conceptions of the good in society or  it can aim to  justify its policies on neutral grounds. (Sher
1997, p. 22; Larmore 1987, p. 44-46). A third approach has however also been distinguished within
the literature. A state can also aim that state actions do not intentionally favor one conception of the
good over another. (Arneson 2003, p. 3-4 and 1990, p. 218).  
The neutrality of effects approach holds that a state should not impose policies which have unequal
effects on the different conceptions of the good in society. If  a certain policy unintentionally, and
even if it has been justified on neutral grounds, is more beneficial for conception of the good A than
it is for conception of the good B, it is considered not legitimate. Both opponents (Sher 1997, p. 3-4;
Arneson  2003,  p.  4) and defenders (Larmore  1987, p.  44-46) of liberal  neutrality consider this
approach indefensible. Every policy is bound to have some effects on the different conceptions of
the good  within the jurisdiction of a state. Arneson provides a compelling example.  The right of
freedom of religion, which enables citizens to proselytize, will have negative effects on unattractive
and very orthodox religions. It will become harder for them to stop their members from leaving the
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church. Attractive and newer religions on the other hand will benefit from such policies, it will be
easier for them to find new members for their church. The policy is thus not legitimate according to
the  neutrality of effects approach.  However, if  there is  no freedom of religion,  the unattractive
orthodox churches will benefit, because members are not allowed to leave. It will be harder for new
religions to convert new believers,  simply because nobody has the freedom to  alter religion.  This
policy is also not neutral in its effects. In this case either  state policy would  not be  neutral.  In
neither way a state can guarantee that the effects of  its policies are neutral (Arneson  2003,  p. 4;
Weinstock 1999, p. 52-57).
The neutrality of effects approach is thus indefensible. This however also means that it is not fair to
criticize the neutral  state on the fact that its policies have unequal consequences. This would be
attacking a straw man concept of the doctrine of neutrality (Sadurski 1990, p. 123-125;  Weinstock
1999, p.  52-57) Perfectionists or other critics should not criticize the doctrine of neutrality on the
fact that a neutral state does not have neutral effects on society (Arneson 2003, p. 4; Sher 1997, p.
4-5). Such an argument against liberal neutrality has been made for example by Kymlicka in his
book Multicultural  Citizenship  (1995,  p. 4-8). He argues that modern neutral states are not really
neutral, because minority cultures are structurally,  but unintentionally, undermined by all sorts of
state policies. These policies, such as a state language or public education laws, are justified on
neutral grounds, but are unintentionally favorable to the majority culture and unfavorable to smaller
minorities. 
The neutrality of justification approach is more promising. This approach holds that the state should
justify its policies based on neutral reasons. A neutral state should thus not justify a certain policy or
law based on the superiority of some conception of the good. Sher thinks more should be demanded
than simply a neutral reason for a policy. He thinks that a state can always find a neutral reason to
defend its actions, even for the most  perfectionist policies. He therefore demands that this neutral
reason is of considerable strength: “A law, institution or other political arrangement is neutrally
justifiable if and only if at least one possible argument for it has only neutral normative premises,
and contains no implausible premises or obvious fallacies, and provides a justification of reasonable
strength” (Sher, 1997, p. 26-27). 
Closely related to this  idea  of neutrality of justification is the approach of neutrality of aim or
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intended effect. The neutrality of aim approach demands from a state that it should not deliberately
make policies which favor one conception of the good over another (Rawls 1988, p. 261-262). If a
state  knows  that  a  certain  policy  will  negatively  affect  a  particular  conception  of  the  good
tremendously, it should refrain from imposing it, regardless whether it can be justified neutrally. An
example of such  a  policy might be  the enactment of Roman Catholicism as the state religion,  in
order to create  stability within  a state.  Social  stability is  a neutral  reason and the policy could
therefore be justified  neutrally.  It  will  however not be legitimized  if  we demand that a state is
neutral  in their  aim Arneson 1990 p. 218-219, 2003, p. 3-5).  The difference between neutrality of
justification and neutrality of aim should however not be  exaggerated in my opinion. Especially
with Sher's additional demand that a reason for adopting a policy should be sufficiently strong, it
seems very hard to justify policies which manifestly favor one conception of the good over another.
They can also be easily combined. This stronger approach would then demand that a state shouldn't
justify its policies based on the superiority of a certain conception of the good, and that a state
shouldn't make policies which deliberately favor one conception of the good over another (Arneson
2003, p. 3-5). 
I think Sher defends the most promising concept of neutrality.  Demanding neutrality of effects is
simply indefensible. Every policy is bound to have unequal effects on the different conceptions of
the  good  in  society.  Arguing  for  neutrality  of  effects  is,  if  pushed  to  the  extreme,  ultimately
untenable. It is inherent in policies that they have effects on society. Laws, rules and policies exist
to  regulate  societies.  Arguing that  the effects  of  policies might  not  in the slightest  favor  some
pursuits of the good life of individuals over another, is ultimately the same as arguing against the
idea of policies and thus the same as arguing against the state in general. Neutrality of justification
is a more promising approach. A state can be neutral in the way it justifies its policies. It can refrain
from claiming  the superiority of  a conception of the good and  it can refrain from considerations
about the good when it justifies laws. Sher's additional criterion that the neutral reason should be of
reasonable strength seems to be a necessary addition. Not only should the state provide a neutral
reason for a policy, it should also be of considerable strength.  Sher's approach will also rule out
policies which are justified neutrality, but which intentionally favor one conception of the good over
another. The reasons for adopting such policies, in the light of the tremendous effects it has some
conceptions  of  the  good,  will  simply  not  be  considered  strong  enough.  However,  it  can  be
additionally demanded that the state also refrains from aiming to promote a certain conception of
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the good over another.  
4.3. Arguments in favor of neutrality 
Now that the general features of the doctrine of neutrality have been discussed, I want to say a little
more about the arguments in favor of it. My main aim in this thesis is to challenge the claim that
state neutrality is necessary to protect and respect the autonomy of individuals. There are however
different defenses in favor of state neutrality. I will discuss three influential arguments briefly. Sher
(1997,  p.  42-43)  argues  that  between  these  different  arguments the  defended  concept  of  state
neutrality tends to differ. This makes it impossible to define what the concept of neutrality exactly
entails within the literature. 
4.3.1. Moral skepticism
An argument in favor of neutrality is based on skepticism about our ability to know what is good.
This argument has been for instance defended by Ackerman. He asks us rhetorically: “But can we
know anything  about  the  good?  Sure  all  of  us  have  beliefs;  but  isn't  it  merely  pretentious  to
proclaim one's  knowledge on this  subject?  Worse  than  pretentious  –  isn't  some loud  foul  fool
typically the first to impose his self-righteous certainties on others? (Ackerman 1980, p. 368)” He
defends the claim that it is impossible to know what is good in life and therefore the state should
refrain from imposing a certain conception of it in society. It would be pretentious and foolish to do
so. 
This argument has been criticized fiercely by opponents as well as defenders of state neutrality (R.
Dworkin 1978, p. 142-143,  Raz 1986, p. 160). Larmore for example argues that there is no need to
be skeptical about the possibility of knowing what moral facts are, such as conceptions of the good.
Moral facts should be established with a contextual method. This means that a controversial moral
fact is true if it is supported by another non-controversial empirical or moral fact. Only if this other
moral or empirical fact becomes a matter of dispute, then there is a reason to question the former
moral fact.  He argues that this method is also used within  the empirical sciences. We should not
demand more in order to establish moral facts, than we demand in order to establish empirical facts
(Larmore  1987,  p.  29-30).  Sher  seems to  share  this  view.  He thinks  that  a  moral  fact  can  be
established if it is coherent with all other facts that are known (Sher 1997, p. 145-149). He secondly
argues that moral skepticism proves too much. If we are skeptical about our ability to know what is
good, we would also be unable to determine what is right and what justice requires of us. It even
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undermines the argument in favor of neutrality. If we cannot know what is morally required, we can
also not know whether we should be neutral (Sher 1997, p. 140-145). 
I  think  that  moral  skepticism about  the good  or  morality undermines  the  practice  of  political
philosophy. Conflicts between individuals and disputes about rights, property and benefits are facts
about human life that require moral answers. Fundamentally doubting the possibility of providing
such answers doesn't  solve  these  problems.  I  think  that  political  philosophy should  be  able  to
provide a moral framework  to solve these  issues.  There can be good reasons to opt for a neutral
state, but the argument in favor of it should, in my opinion, not be based on doubts about our ability
to make moral judgments. It is simply not effective and to some extent self-defeating for a political
philosopher to be a moral skeptic, regardless whether one defends  the doctrine of neutrality or a
perfectionist  theory.  I'm aware that  this  is  a  very quick conclusion.  This  skeptical  argument  is
complicated  and  has  been  discussed  extensively  within  political  philosophy.  It  however  goes
beyond the aim of this thesis to discuss it fully. For now, I would just like to point out some of the
problems of this argument. 
4.3.2. Modus Vivendi
A more compelling argument in favor of neutrality is made by Larmore (1987, p. 46-47) and, in his
later works, by Rawls (1988). Larmore explicitly does not base his argument in favor of neutrality
on the idea of the autonomous individual, but on more pragmatic grounds. The ideal of autonomy is
namely too controversial for many people (Larmore 1987,  p. 50-53). Conceptions of the good of
individuals within society are plural, controversial and in many cases incommensurable. In order to
maintain a peaceful and stable society Larmore thinks it is necessary that the state should be neutral
about  these  different  conceptions of  the  good.  In  their  private  lives  citizens  might  pursue  any
conception of the good, but in the public realm these arguments should not be used. In the public
realm people should retreat to neutral grounds in order to engage in rational dialogue about what is
good for the state, society, and the different conceptions of the good life (Larmore 1987, p. 54-56).
This argument in favor of liberal neutrality has been called the  modus vivendi argument (Caney
1991, p. 471)
One obvious  criticism that  has  been raised  against  this  argument  is  that  it  doesn't  seem to  be
empirically plausible. Many states make nonneutral policies but are however still very stable. Caney
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argues that Great-Britannia, France and Spain qualify as nonneutral, but stable, states. Some of the
most perfectionist states  even seem to be capable of maintaining civil peace.  The fact that these
nonneutral  states  are stable  is  possible  because many individuals do not  wish to  advance their
conception of the good at all costs. Stability, prosperity and security are reasons why individuals
will accept that a state is not neutral in all situations (Caney 1991, p. 471-473; Sher 1997, p. 118-
129).
I do not wish to assess the empirical claims made by Sher and Caney, but intuitive ly their argument
seems right. I find Larmore's argument for neutrality troublesome for another reason. Larmore and
Rawls argue that their argument in favor of neutrality is not controversial. It is based on stability,
which indeed doesn't seem to be very controversial. Larmore acknowledges however that stability
alone doesn't mean that a state has to be neutral. If controversial views are held by  just a small
minority,  stability  could  also  be  achieved by oppressing  this  conception  of  the  good.  Larmore
doesn't seem to favor this idea and therefore argues that also equal respect for conceptions of the
good is a value underlying neutrality.  Individuals should consider  all others  capable of forming
respectable  conceptions  of  the  good life,  even if  they are  completely different  from their  own
(Larmore 1987, p. 59-64). This second norm seems to reintroduce the problem of controversiality
however. Equal respect for other people's capability to form a respectable conception of the good
seems far from being a shared value. Not many orthodox Muslims or Christians for example seem
to share the idea that also actively homosexual men are capable of forming respectable conceptions
of the good. Equal respect seems to be just as controversial as personal autonomy.  
4.3.3. Oppression 
The last argument I will discuss has for instance been defended by Berlin (1969, p. 181-191) and
Ackerman (1980, p. 371). This argument holds that the state should be neutral in order to prevent it
from becoming oppressive and totalitarian.  States that are not neutral about the good will become
paternalistic  and  oppressive,  if  they are not  restrained in  their reasons  for  making  policies.
Especially  Berlin  is  very  critical  of  the  idea  that  the  state  should  promote  the  autonomy  of
individuals. He thinks this will lead to a state in which individuals are bullied and oppressed with an
appeal  to their  'true'  and higher  interests.  Similar arguments have been  made in  various  ways
(Caney 1991, p. 465-476), but all ultimately hold that the freedom of individuals in some way will
be jeopardized by the state if it is not neutral. The nonneutral state will determine to a large extent
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how people ought to live. People will not be free anymore to decide for themselves which kind of
life they wish to live, but are all forced to live in accordance with a single higher ideal. Ackerman
(1980,  p.  371) argues that this tendency of the state to become paternalistic and oppressive is a
reason to favor neutrality.
Sher is critical of this argument. He again makes an empirical claim. He argues that there are many
nonneutral states which are not oppressive or which diminish the freedom of individuals. He thinks
that the dangers of promoting certain conceptions of the good are exaggerated. It firstly didn't seem
to have happened in many western non-neutral countries. Secondly, paternalism and oppression can
be avoided in a nonneutral state if fundamental human rights and rule of law are upheld (Sher 1997,
p. 111-114).
In my opinion  Sher  underestimates  the dangers of paternalism  in a nonneutral state. The risk of
excessive state paternalism is a clear and should be considered when defending  a theory which
holds that the state should promote a  particular conception of the good. I do however think that
promoting personal autonomy doesn't soon run the risk of becoming paternalistic. It is evidently
contrary to the idea of personal autonomy that people are bullied and forced to live their lives in a
certain way. The idea of personal autonomy, as has been defended in chapter  three, also leaves
enough room for individuals to decide what conception of the good they wish to pursue. It doesn't
necessarily compromise the plurality of societies.  
4.4. Some final remarks
The concept of neutrality is elusive and the arguments in favor of it are numerous and diverse. I do
not think I have treated all of the nuances of the concept deeply and fundamentally. But I do think
that the main aspects of the concept should be clear. Also I didn't discuss in much detail the other
arguments in favor of neutrality and their problems. For the purpose of this thesis, I however think
that they are discussed sufficiently to proceed to next chapter. However, for a complete rebuttal of
them a more extensive discussion would be needed. 
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Chapter five: Autonomy and the Neutral State 
In this chapter I will discuss the relation between the doctrine of neutrality and personal autonomy.
Is it required that the state remains neutral about conceptions of the good to protect the autonomy of
individuals?  This  claim has  most  notably  been  defended by Ronald  Dworkin,  but  many other
authors have made similar arguments in favor of neutrality. What all these arguments share is the
idea that a neutral state should be favored if we want to take the autonomy of people seriously.
Within  the  literature  a  distinction  has  been made  between  two sorts  of  arguments  in  favor  of
neutrality based on autonomy  (Sher  1997,  p.  10-14).  The first  argument  holds that  in  order  to
respect the autonomy of people the state should be neutral. Nonneutral policies would undermine
the  autonomy  of  individuals and  would  therefore be disrespectful  to  them.  States should,  out of
respect,  refrain from making laws and policies  which are based on conceptions of the good. The
second argument is related, but on closer inspection, different. Proponents of this argument defend
the claim that personal autonomy can only, or at least to the greatest extent, be promoted in a neutral
state.  Nonneutral policies lead to  less personal autonomy of individuals in society.  It  is a more
pragmatical argument. 
I will challenge both these arguments. In  the next sections I will firstly discuss both  of them in
further detail.  Then I will argue that state neutrality is not the best way to respect  the personal
autonomy of individuals.  On the contrary, I will argue that it fails to do so.  I will use the case of
women from traditional cultures as leading example to support this claim. I will finally defend the
claim that  the  second  argument  also  doesn't  hold.  It  is  possible  and  effective to  promote  the
autonomy of individuals with nonneutral policies. 
5.1.1. Respect for autonomy 
A state should treat all  its citizens with respect.  All  values,  beliefs and goals of  individuals in
society should be taken seriously and deserve equal respect from the state. Some people want to be
devout, humble and modest Christians and others urban post-modern artists. Within a liberal state
all such different ways of life should be possible and should be treated equally.
This  common  sense  argument  has  been  most  notably  made  by  Ronald  Dworkin  in  his  essay
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Liberalism  (1972).  He  describes  a  fundamental  distinction  between  two  ways  to  answer  the
question:  "What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as equals?" (R. Dworkin 1972,
p. 127). According to him, the liberal answer to this question is that the state should remain neutral.
Treating individuals with equal respect means that a state should consider them as independent and
free human beings who are capable of living their lives in accordance with their own conception of
the good. No distinction should be made between a scholar who prefers a life of contemplation and
fine arts and a beer-drinking television-watching citizen who likes to barbeque in his backyard.
Both live equally legitimate ways of life and the state should: “... so far as possible, be independent
of any particular conception of the good (R. Dworkin 1972, p. 127)”. 
The second answer to the question is that the state cannot be neutral about conceptions of the good
and that the true task of the state is to promote a concept of the human flourishing in society. The
state  has an obligation to  help individuals  achieve intrinsically valuable  things in  life.  Treating
people as equals means helping them equally to achieve an intrinsically good life. The beer-drinking
citizen  should  be  helped  to  appreciate  the  fine  arts  for  example.  Dworkin  finds  this  answer
unsatisfactory. Favoring some conception of the good over the other means that some conceptions
of the good that citizens hold are considered less important or not valuable. Other conceptions are
on the other hand considered more valuable and better. In this way some people, who live a state-
preferred way of life, are treated with more respect than others. The autonomy of individuals with a
different way of life is however not respected. Therefore this answer to the question should not be
favored (R. Dworkin 192, p. 127-134). Arguments in a similar vein of equal respect for citizens and
their conceptions of the good have been made by Ackerman (1980, p. 367-368) and Rawls. Rawls'
statement that states which promote a conception of the good do not take seriously the distinction
between individuals is, I believe, a famous example of this (Rawls 1972, p. 27).    
The neutral state and its citizens are restrained by the harm-principle in their actions. Everybody is
free to pursue their own conception of the good as long as they don't harm or interfere with  the
pursuit of others in society. Individuals are thus limited in their pursuit of a good life by the similar
pursuits of the good of others. The state should make sure that the harm-principle is not violated and
only when it is violated the state might use coercive means in order to undo these injustices. The
state should judge whether harm is done to others in a non-perfectionist way; considerations of
harm should be independent of the moral worth of actions (Sadurski 1990, p. 112).
 31
The idea that respecting the autonomy of individuals requires that the state should remain neutral
has been criticized in various ways. A first way would be to question whether it is a task of the state
to treat the autonomy of individuals with equal respect or that the state should respect people in an
other way (Mason 1990, p. 450-451). This would be quite a controversial argument to defend and I
do not wish to pursue it in this thesis, simply because it goes beyond the scope of it. I  agree with
defenders of state neutrality that personal autonomy is valuable and deserves respect from the state.
I only wish to question whether a neutral state is capable  of respecting and promoting personal
autonomy. I do however not wish to question whether respecting and promoting personal autonomy
is a task of the state at all. A second way would be to argue that there are all sorts of non-coercive
ways in which the state can promote conceptions of the good. I will say more about this argument
later. In this  section I want to discuss the  argument that  holds that respecting autonomy requires
more than simply being neutral about conceptions of the good.  
In his book The Morality of Freedom (1986) Raz argues that a state doesn't sufficiently respect the
autonomy of citizens if it remains neutral about the different conceptions of the good. The argument
that  autonomy  should be respected does not  automatically lead to the conclusion that the state
should not justify its policies based on nonneutral reasons (Raz 1986, p. 130-133; p. 157-162). On
the  contrary,  to  respect  the  autonomy  of  individuals  properly,  more  is  required  than  simple
abstention from judgments about the good. “... since autonomy is morally valuable there is reason
for everybody to make himself and everyone else autonomous (Raz 1986, p. 407)”. 
Raz argues that the state has an obligation to make people autonomous. The freedom to pursue one's
own conception of the good is still a very important aspect of an autonomous life, but only to the
extent that it contributes to the autonomy of people. The state should also actively try to foster the
autonomy of individuals. This means that it should help them to critically reflect on their options
and that  it should  guarantee  that  there  are  sufficiently  good  options  available  for  individuals.
Autonomy  thus requires  more  than  the  negative  obligation  to  abstain  from  paternalism  and
coercion, but a state also has a positive obligation to help and foster the autonomy of citizens (Raz
1986, p. 408-410). Mason similarly argues that respecting autonomy doesn't mean that the doctrine
of  state neutrality  should be accepted.  He argues that,  if autonomy is  to be respected, the state
should foster and endorse conceptions of the good in which critical reflection and independence of
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individuals are considered valuable (Mason 1990, p. 444-446). 
Remarkably,  Raz  argues that the harm principle  should be explained as a perfectionist principle
which demands that the state should promote the autonomy of individuals (Raz 1986, p. 419-421).
Sadurski is critical of this interpretation of the harm principle (Sadurski 1990, p. 130-133). For the
sake of clarity I will assume that Sadurski's interpretation of the harm principle is right. It should be
considered a neutral principle of justified state coercion. Quarreling about the true meaning of the
harm principle seems, for the present purpose, not very useful. What should be clear is that Raz
envisions a larger role for the state than proponents of liberal neutrality.  
5.1.2. Putting state neutrality to the test
Arguments  in  favor  of  liberal  neutrality  that  hold  that  respecting  the  autonomy of  individuals
requires  a neutral state are thus contested. In this section I will put the arguments to the test. To
what extent does liberal neutrality guarantee that individuals have personal autonomy? I will use the
case of women from orthodox or traditional cultures as a leading example throughout this section in
order  to  support  the  claim  that  a  neutral  state  cannot  guarantee  the  personal  autonomy  of
individuals. In chapter three I have argued that personal autonomy has three criteria. I will discuss
these criteria separately in this section.
5.1.2.1. Self-government
The first  requirement of  personal autonomy that I defined was self-government.  An autonomous
individual should not only be free to do what he wants, but  also be capable to live his life in
accordance with his higher ideals, goals and beliefs. He should, in other words, have a life plan. A
person  who  drifts through life  without  any  guidance  of  his  values  and  beliefs shouldn't  be
considered autonomous. Individuals should critically reflect on how they want to live and what
goals in life they wish to pursue. 
Women for orthodox cultures should thus be guided by their own values, beliefs and goals in life.
They should be able  to  form their  own conceptions of the good and should be able  to  live in
accordance with them. This can of course mean that women choose for a way of life in which they
are subordinate to their husbands and their tasks are to do the household and to raise the children.
These women presumably believe in traditional family values and  consider  living in accordance
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with the orthodox rules of church valuable and meaningful. In their daily lives they are thus clearly
guided by their higher values and beliefs. Their higher order beliefs are coherent with their actual
way of life. It can be argued that they meet this requirement extremely well. In order to live in
accordance with the stringent rules of an orthodox religion a high level of self-discipline seems to
be  required.  It  can  hardly  be  argued  that  these  women  drift  through  life  without  meaning  or
guidance. On the contrary, the problem would seem to be that they are guided a bit too much by
their religion. 
A neutral state seems to be capable of facilitating this aspect of an autonomous life very well. It
allows individuals to have different conceptions of the good life and to live in accordance with
them.  Orthodox women in a neutral society can live their private lives in accordance with their
conception of the good.  It however also possible and allowed  to drift through life with out any
meaning in a neutral state. This might not be the case for the women of orthodox cultures, but for
many others this can be a problem. In a neutral state people can live, as Frankfurt describes it, as
wantons. They can live simply to fulfill their  first-order desires and urges without any clear goals
and values in life.  
This brings me to the second aspect of self-government, namely that people critically reflect upon
their goals in life and are able to alter and change them. Again, a neutral state provides individuals
the possibility of altering their convictions, values and beliefs. Women from traditional cultures are
free to alter their life plans unpunished. Some have argued that this mere possibility is potentially
threatening to orthodox cultures. I believe this is true. The possibility to leave a  traditional  social
group or to apostatize from an orthodox religion is already a huge step towards an autonomous life.
However these freedoms do not in any way guarantee that women  from orthodox social groups
critically reflect on their values, beliefs and goals in life. Critical reflection of women on religious
teachings and dogma will  presumably not be fostered in these social  environments. In order to
enable  women  from traditional  societies  to  critically  reflect  on  their  plans  in  life  more  seems
necessary than simply the right to do so. It would for instance require a kind of public education in
which such a critical attitude towards claims about the good life are fostered. 
A neutral state thus provides the possibility to life in accordance with one's higher ideals, goals and
values, but doesn't in any way guarantee it. The same seems to be case for critical reflection on
one's ideals and values in life. It is possible in a neutral state that an individual drifts through life
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without meaning or lives in accordance with unexamined and blindly accepted principles. Women
from traditional  social environments don't seem to lack guidance of higher order values,  but the
danger that their principles have been accepted unexamined and blindly looms large. Respecting the
autonomy of these women would thus demand from the state to foster their capabilities of critical
reflection. Neutral states fail to guarantee this requirement of an autonomous life. 
5.1.2.2. Independence
This brings me to the second requirement of an autonomous life. Critical reflection should be free
from manipulation and coercion by illegitimate external influences. An individual should be able to
live in accordance with a life plan that is his own. He should, in other words, follow this life plan
for his own reasons. If certain values and beliefs are the result of past manipulations, coercion,  or
indoctrination we don't consider a person to be independent and therefore not autonomous. 
Especially the problem of manipulation poses an enormous challenge to both the proponents as the
opponents of state neutrality. In a neutral state people are clearly protected against the more severe
forms  of  coercion.  In  a neutral  state  people  will  for  example be  protected  against  robberies,
extortion and blackmailing.  If the robbers, extortioners, or blackmailers are caught they will  be
punished  and  the  victims  will  generally  be  compensated  in  their  losses.  Contracts  signed  and
promises made under these forms of threat will not be considered genuine and will not be legally
binding. To this extent a neutral state can protect the independence of individuals. 
The more subtle forms of coercion and manipulation are however less easy to protect against in a
neutral  state.  Women from traditional cultures will  probably be indoctrinated or manipulated in
more subtle ways. They will be taught to fear the judgment of some god or will be threatened with
expulsion from the social group  and their family. Also social segregation and the creation of an
image of a cruel and godless outside world can contribute to the acceptance of traditional norms and
values by these women. Within a neutral state protection against such kinds of manipulation seems
hard to achieve.  If  these women actually endorse these traditional ways of life there seems no
ground to  assume that  they are  manipulated.  In  other  words,  if  these  women  do not  consider
themselves to be  harmed,  there is no  ground  on  which the neutral state  can legitimately act.  A
neutral state can't argue that the way of life of these women is demeaning and should be avoided,
because this would be a judgment about the intrinsic value of the good life. Neutral states seem to
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be unable to cope with this kind of manipulation and subtle coercion.  
It would however be too optimistic to conclude that nonneutral policies can solve this problem of
manipulation and subtle coercion  entirely. Firstly,  as pointed out by Waldron, manipulation and
coercion by the state will undermine  the autonomy of  individuals as well. A state cannot simply
force or manipulate women from traditional social cultures to hold more autonomous beliefs. This
would  be to a large extent self-defeating.  If  absence of manipulation is  considered a necessary
condition  of  personal  autonomy and it  is  demanded that  a  state  should  guarantee  the  personal
autonomy of individuals, than the state cannot resort to manipulation itself in order to guarantee
personal autonomy.  If  it  did,  it  would try to  achieve the absence of manipulation by means of
manipulation. The state would violate people's personal autonomy, with an appeal to this very same
principle.  Such  policies  would  thus  undermine  their  own purpose  and  would be  self-defeating
(Waldron 1988,  p. 1141-1153). What however is possible with nonneutral policies is to foster  the
independence of women in a non-coercive way. A state can for instance teach women which rights
they have and  which different conceptions of the good life  exist.  By means of subsidies or tax
benefits, a state can also make it more attractive for women to pursue a career and to have a paid
job. This could foster the economic independence of women. 
Independence from manipulation and subtle coercion remains a huge problem still. Everybody is
undeniably  influenced  by  their social  environment.  Complete  independence  from  everyone  is
simply impossible.  With nonneutral policies which promote independence and critical reflection
noncoercively, a state can however try to improve the independence of individuals. The neutral state
seems to be less capable to make people more independent.
5.1.2.3. An adequate range of options
The last requirement of autonomy is that individuals should also have an adequate range of options
to choose from. It  is not enough that people can critically reflect on their life independently of
illegitimate external influences.  Individuals should also be able to  choose various  and different
ways to live their  lives. In order to be autonomous there should be the possibility of an actual
genuine choice of life in society.   
Women  from traditional  societies  should  thus  have  the  option  of  choosing  for  fundamentally
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different ways of life within society. It would be extremely frustrating for them to find out, after
they have critically reflected on their values, beliefs, and goals independently, that there is actually
only one way of life possible in their state. It would be equally frustrating if these women had to
choose between a bad or an even worse option. For example, between living in a traditional culture
or to fall in extreme poverty, because of a lack of basic income. To be autonomous, in other words,
requires multiple good and diverse ways of life to choose from. 
A neutral state, again, seems to provide the possibility of altering one's way of life. In a neutral state
citizens will not be stoned to death for changing their religion or for apostasy. Kymlicka however
argues that the neutral state is also the best way to guarantee that there is an adequate range of ways
of  life  to  choose  from.  A neutral  state  provides  a  cultural  marketplace  in  which  all  different
conceptions of the good compete for the adherence of the citizens. This competition will lead to the
disappearance of unfeasible and unattractive ways  of life and will make sure that only a range of
good  and  meaningful  ways  of  life  will  prevail.  This  'invisible  hand'  will  determine which
conceptions  of the good are worthwhile to have and which  of them should clearly be abandoned.
The result will be a plural society of different good ways of life (Kymlicka 1989, p. 893-895; Caney
1991, p. 459).
Caney is very critical about the capability of the cultural marketplace to provide a range of valuable
and good ways of life. If a conception of the good is marketable, it doesn't mean that it is also an
inherently good way of life. Very meaningless and repulsive ways of life could be the outcome of
cultural  competition through the cultural market. It is naive and too optimistic to assume that an
adequate range of good ways of life will  arise through  a process of cultural competition (Caney
1991, p. 458-460).
I agree with Caney that Kymlicka makes too optimistic assumptions about the cultural marketplace.
It is to no extent certain that this cultural market will provide sufficient meaningful ways of life. It
seems, on the contrary, very well possible that without state interference some unmarketable options
will slowly disappear and that society will become less diverse. Also, I believe that the idea of the
cultural  marketplace  itself  is  a bit  too optimistic.  Or  at  least  there  seem to  be  many regional
monopolies on it. Segregation of social groups is still a large problem, which doesn't seem to solve
itself. Many people live in a social and geographical area with only a single conception of the good
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life. They are hardly confronted with fundamentally other ways of life. In order to make sure that
people know about different  good ways of life and that some unmarketable good options prevail,
some state interference seems to be required. 
Kymlicka is thus too optimistic. In order to protect a plurality of conceptions of the good, it might
be necessary to promote some ways of life and to discriminate against others. A neutral state is not
capable of justifying these required policies. It therefore also fails to guarantee that individuals have
an adequate range of ways of life to choose from. Nonneutral policies seem again to be required. 
5.1.3. final remarks
I think it is fair to conclude that the autonomy of individuals is insufficiently protected in a neutral
state.  The  case  of  women  from traditional  social  groups  has  helped  to  point  at  some  of  the
weaknesses of neutral states. Although it provides some basic rights which ensure the possibility of
living autonomously, in order to guarantee that individuals are truly autonomous a more proactive
state seems to be  necessary. In order to respect the autonomy of  individuals it is not enough to
abstain from acting on what is good, but requires that the value autonomy is fostered and promoted
in society. 
5.2.1. The endorsement constraint
In order to respect the autonomy of individuals the state seems to be obliged to do more than simply
abstain from promoting conceptions of the good. I have argued that some nonneutral policies and
laws are necessary if a state wants to fully respect the autonomy of its citizens. But to what extent is
it possible for a state  to make citizens more autonomous? The second argument I wish to discuss
holds that policies which try to promote conceptions of the good, for instance personal autonomy,
are self-defeating.  Ronald Dworkin discusses this argument in much detail in his book Sovereign
Virtue (2000).  In this section I will primarily focus on his work, but similar arguments have been
made for  example  by Ackerman (1980,  p.  11-12)  and Kymlicka  (2002,  p.  216-217).  All  these
arguments hold that the state should refrain from imposing conceptions of the good, because it will
be ineffective and self-defeating to do so. A state should remain neutral about issues concerning the
good life, because ultimately a good life is lived from the “inside” and cannot be imposed externally
(Kymlicka 2002, p. 216). 
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I will discuss later in this section what the endorsement constraint entails and at the end of it what is
self-defeating about  non-neutral  policies.  But it  is  firstly necessary to  discuss a distinction that
Ronald  Dworkin  makes  between  critical  and  volitional  interests  of  people.  Volitional  interests
concern the satisfaction of desires and the achievement of pleasurable experiences in life. A good
life consists partly in achieving these interests. They do however not contribute to overall judgment
of an individual about  the value of his  life.  To make it  more clear:  I  can have an urge to  eat
strawberry ice cream. I might feel disappointed if I fail to fulfill this desire, but I don't consider my
life less valuable if I do so.  Critical interests  on the other hand do have this effect. Some desires,
traits, and values people do find of critical interest of a meaningful and good life. The desire to be a
good parent  can be an  example  of  such  an interest.  Failing to  fulfill  this  interest will  affect  a
person's judgment about how good his life is (R. Dworkin 2000, p. 242-245).
The endorsement constraint concerns these critical interests. Dworkin argues that: “...no component
may even so much as contribute to the value of a person's life without his endorsement (R. Dworkin
2000, p. 248)”. What a person considers his critical interests in life is ultimately dependent on his
own judgment about  their value  to his life. This means that a state cannot successfully force a
person to value certain critical interests with an appeal to the claim that they are inherently good. An
individual's life will not become better if critical interests are forced upon him. His life will not
become  better  without  his  endorsement (R.  Dworkin  2000,  p.  270). Dworkin finds  it  deeply
implausible that a person's life  can become objectively better, if a person himself doesn't see the
benefits of an inherently good interest. (R. Dworkin 2004, p. 354-356).
Dworkin's defense of the endorsement constraint is based on two arguments. He firstly argues that a
good life consists in skilful performance. A person's life is good if he faces the challenges in his life
skilfully and successfully. Not the impact that his actions have in the world, but the way he deals
with all the problems, obstacles, and challenges  he faces in life determines the success  it. Part of
successfully facing a challenge in life is having the right intentions and motives to act. We do not
value a performance which is done for the wrong reasons. In order to lead a successful life of skilful
performance, a person thus needs to endorse his achievements, goals, and challenges (R. Dworkin
2000,  p.  251-254).  This  argument  has  been  criticized  fiercely.  It  is  highly  doubtful  whether
achievements in life are only valuable if they are done for the right reasons. An author can write a
literary masterpiece without recognizing its value himself. He could have written it simply to make
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some money and find his actual work worthless. This doesn't however objectively mean that it is a
worthless achievement or that  the author shouldn't  be praised for  his qualitatively superb  book
(Wilkinson 1996, p. 438-441; Clarcke 2006, p. 114).
Dworkin's second argument is more compelling. He argues that the endorsement constraint should
be based in the idea of moral integrity. He describes this as follows: “Someone has achieved moral
integrity, we may say, when he lives out of the conviction that his life, in its central features, is an
appropriate one, that no other life he might live would be a plainly better response to the parameters
of his ethical situation rightly judged” (R. Dworkin 2000, p. 270). A person's life should be as far as
possible the result of his own actions and performances. He should feel that his life is the best
response  to  the  challenges he faced during his life. Every state action  that successfully  alters an
individual's life or his possibility of facing challenges makes the life of that individual less valuable.
His moral integrity is namely violated. Therefore, the state should not only refrain from imposing
critical interests on people, it should also not narrow down the options people have in life, or force
them to choose their second-best ways of life (R. Dworkin 2000, p. 270-271). 
Dworkin defends the claim that the endorsement constraint forms the basis for the doctrine of state
neutrality. The state simply cannot force people to live a certain objectively good life. A good life is
dependent on a person's endorsement. If somebody fails to endorse certain aspects of his life, these
aspects cannot be considered valuable to him. Policies which try to promote the good of individuals
will thus be self-defeating. For example, forcing somebody to pray for a god he doesn't believe in,
is  generally  considered ineffective  and  a  self-defeating  policy. A state  can  force  somebody to
preform a certain action, but it cannot force him to actually endorse this action as valuable or  as
beneficial for his life. The problem is that endorsement is crucial to consider a person's life good or
worthwhile. State action that tries to promote the good of individuals is therefore self-defeating. A
state can force an individual to do what it considers good. It would however defeat its own purpose,
because a  person's  life can only become better if it is endorsed by the individual himself. If an
individual is forced act, he will most likely not endorse it. States should therefore refrain from such
policies according to Dworkin (2000, p. 278-284).
5.2.2. Endorsement and neutrality
The endorsement constraint appeals to a fundamental intuition about the question when a life can be
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considered good. It is very plausible to argue that a life, at least to some extent, can only be good if
a human himself finds it valuable. Intuitively, we would agree that a deeply unhappy and depressed
person doesn't  live  a  good life,  even if  he  managed to  achieve  all  sorts  of  objectively highly
valuable goals, such  as intellectual and artistic skills,  meaningful work, and personal autonomy.
Many proponents of nonneutral policies therefore accept the endorsement constraint,  for example
Raz (1986, p. 407) and Sher (1997, p. 61). They focus their critique on the second part of Dworkin's
argument: the endorsement constraint requires that a state is neutral about conceptions of the good.
Raz  thus  accepts the endorsement constraint. According to him, it  would be counterintuitive to
argue  that  we  can  force  somebody  to  be autonomous.  The  concept  of  autonomy  requires
independence and self-government, which are both hard to force upon individuals. It would be truly
self-defeating to force somebody to be independent. Autonomy also requires that the state doesn't
coerce and manipulate individuals (Raz 1986, p.  407). In my opinion Raz' conclusion is right.  To
finally return to our case, we cannot force women from traditional cultures to alter their values and
beliefs which make them less autonomous. To force these women not to fear their god and to reject
their culturally imposed values doesn't make them more autonomous. 
But the fact that a state can't force these women to critically reflect and to be independent doesn't
mean a state  has to be neutral  about  conceptions  of  the good life.  The endorsement  constraint
doesn't  get us anywhere near the acceptance of the doctrine of liberal  neutrality.  A much heard
criticism is that the state has means at its disposal that are not necessarily coercive.  The state can
make nonneutral policies, without violating the endorsement constraint.  (Arneson  2003, p. 9-15,
Sher 1997, p. 61). The same is argued in defense of nonneutral policies which should promote
personal autonomy without being self-defeating (Raz 1986, p. 408-410).
An example of such a noncoercive policy is public education. It is possible for a state to teach its
citizens to  be autonomous.  A state can  teach  its citizens to be critical and to be independent.  To
return to the example of women from traditional cultures, it might not be possible to force women
not to believe religious dogma and traditional values anymore, but a state can learn them about the
different  ways of life and  can enable them to critically reflect on their  beliefs and values.  The
development of these mental capabilities  would foster their autonomy (Hurka  1983, p. 158-160;
Raz  1986, p.  408-410).  Another policy that can be pursued  by the state is the creation of more
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valuable options. By means of tax benefits or subsidies valuable options can be created or be made
available. A classical example would be a policy that deliberately makes the opera less expensive in
order to make it affordable for a larger part of the population. All sorts of similar incentives could
be given by the state in order to maintain a variety of ways of life and valuable options. (Raz 1986,
p. 408-410; Sher 1997, p. 65, Arneson 2003, p. 9-15). Both of these mentioned policies are based on
nonneutral reasons, but do not force people to accept a certain conception of the good. The policies
merely provide valuable options and foster the capability of people to lead an autonomous life. The
endorsement  constraint  is  however not  violated  by  the state  when it  enacts such policies.  The
policies are thus not self-defeating.  
This argument has been criticized in two different ways. Waldron argues that noncoercive policies
are also self-defeating of people's personal autonomy. In order to be autonomous a person has to be
independent  from  manipulation  and  coercion.  In  his  view  non-coercive policies  illegitimately
manipulate individuals' preferences and conceptions of the good. Subsidizing particular ways of life
is bribing people to endorse them. Such measures would thus be violating the second requirement of
autonomy:  it  would  be  interfering  with  people's  independence  (Waldron  1988,  p.  1141-1153).
Dworkin too stresses that it is important that endorsements are genuine. The endorsement of values
should not be the result of manipulation (R. Dworkin 2000, p. 270)
In my opinion Waldron  defends a way too broad conception of manipulation.  It has been argued
earlier that manipulation is a concept that is hard to define. To some extent we are “manipulated”, or
to use a better term, formed by our social environment. Endorsement of values in life will never be
completely  independent  of  influences  of  others.  Not  all  such  influences  are  downright
manipulations. I am not bribed by the Dutch state to study political science, because they subsidize
higher education in the Netherlands. I'm not manipulated by my parents to value an autonomous life
and to value intellectual challenges. Providing citizens with the opportunity to visit the opera for a
reduced  price isn't manipulation either.  Intuitively, it seems logical to conclude that manipulation
should  be  interpreted  more  narrowly.  Manipulation  seems to  mean  something like  deliberately
making a person act contrary to his own interests or goals by subtly influencing him. In its daily
use, manipulation refers to a shady business which is intended to make the manipulator better off at
the expense of the manipulated. I have argued early that an exact definition of manipulation is hard
to find, but subsidizing certain activities, such as studying and visiting the opera, doesn't seem to
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fall under its scope. Firstly, because the state doesn't aim to benefit from its policies at the expense
of their citizens. Secondly, there is still an opportunity for individuals to genuinely choose another
way of life if such policies are enacted. I'm not tricked into following an education and I'm not
forced or manipulated to go the opera. Waldron's argument cannot hold for that reason. If all these
influences count as  manipulations than the independence of individuals is violated constantly and
very few people could be considered autonomous. 
A second line of critique is raised by Weinstock (1999, p. 52-57). He argues that also a neutral state
is justified to enact non-coercive policies which promote education. He defends  the claim that a
neutral  state  can  promote  conceptions  of  the  good  that  are  not  controversial  and  that  public
education is an uncontroversial good.  The neutral state is thus not so restrained as argued by Hurka.
I have argued earlier that  the concept of neutrality which holds that the state  should only refrain
from imposing controversial conceptions of the good is problematic. I secondly don't agree with the
claim that Hurka's view on education is uncontroversial. Surely consensus can be reached over the
idea that educating children is  valuable.  The curriculum however  is,  and has proven to be, not
something that is likely to gain support from everybody. Hurka's argument that the state should
promote the ideal of autonomy, critical reflection and equality will definitely not be accepted by all
groups  in  society.  Such  policies  are  simply  not  defensible  with  neutral  reasons.  Weinstock's
argument that Hurka's nonneutral policies can be achieved in a neutral state cannot thus hold either.
5.2.3. The problem of later endorsement 
Non-coercive  policies  can  promote  conceptions  of  the  good without  violating  the  endorsement
constraint or the personal autonomy of citizens.  The endorsement constraint doesn't force us to
accept  the  doctrine of  state  neutrality.  Some  authors  have made  even  a  bolder  argument.  The
endorsement constraint doesn't even lead to the conclusion that coercive polices are always  self-
defeating and ineffective. The argument rests on the idea of later endorsement. 
Many children are forced by their parents to go to  primary school  against their will. They might
even hate  school and rather play outside.  At that time these children do not endorse the value of
their  education.  It  is however  not  unlikely that  later  in  their lives,  for  example when  they are
admitted to university, they come to see the value of this earlier enforcement by their parents. They
endorse  the  value  of  their  primary  education  later  in  their  life.  This  is  an  example  of later
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endorsement.  Dworkin  admits  that  such  later  endorsements  can  occur  and  give  value  to  an
individual's life.  Aspects of my earlier life which at the time I didn't consider valuable, can still
contribute to the value of my life now if I come to see their merits and endorse them (R. Dworkin
2004, p. 354-356)
This however opens the door for all kind of coercive measures. Sher (1997, p. 68-71) for instance
argues that coercive policies by the state can be justified if they guarantee that people are more
autonomous later in their lives. The state initially violates the endorsement constraint,  but it can
later seem to be justified if an individual endorses this coercive action. He can later see the potential
value of the earlier enforcement. This possibility is also explored by Wilkinson. He argues that the
endorsement  constraint,  if  we  accept  the  idea  of  later  endorsement,  become  a  very  modest
restriction of state  policies. It would be however also implausible to argue that later endorsement
has no value at all (Wilkinson 2003, p. 181-188). 
In the previous section I have argued that promoting autonomy by means of coercion seems to be
self-defeating. Sher's  and Wilkinson's argument however sheds new light on this  claim. Although
forcing women  to alter their lives will be  undermining their autonomy and own life-plans at that
particular moment, they might consider these measures helpful and valuable later in life. I can only
imagine extreme situations in which such coercive actions might be justified. For example  in the
case of severe domestic violence or when a person is helplessly addicted to a deadly drugs. It is not
unlikely that the abusive husband and the abused wife do not want to be separated or that the addict
might not want kick off from the drugs he uses. In these cases it might be better if people are forced
to be separated or are forced to stop using drug, because it will evidently enable them to be more
autonomous  later  in  their life.  There is also good reason to suppose that they will endorse these
enforcements later. These cases  show another weakness of the endorsement constraint. There are
conceivable situations in which even coercive state actions are not self-defeating in promoting the
autonomy of individuals. In many cases however I agree with Sher that such interferences will not
be justified.  We simply cannot assume that people will always endorse state coercion later. For
example, imagine that a state would force women from traditional social environments to abandon
their  beliefs  and values.  This  state  cannot reasonably argue that  such state  interference will  be
evidently, and by all these women, endorsed later. 
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5.2.4. An objectively better life
The previous section leads to the last issue concerning the endorsement constraint I wish to discuss.
Is it true that a life cannot become any better if it isn't endorsed by an individual? Dworkin defines
the concept of moral integrity quite strongly (2000, p. 271-277). A life can never become better if it
is partly the result of enforcement or lacked the necessary genuine endorsement. The sole criterion
to determine whether a life is good, seems to be whether a life met this criteria of moral integrity. A
self-chosen and endorsed life is always more valuable than an enforced or predetermined life.  
This strong claim has been questioned by many (Sher 1997 p. 60-61; Arneson 2004, p. 87-89 and
1999, p. 135-139; Wilkinson 1996, p. 444-446, Clarcke 2006, p. 115). Firstly these authors do not
agree  with the view that moral integrity has  absolute priority over all other values. Surely  moral
integrity is important, but it seems implausible to argue that it always has priority, even when very
much can be gained by forcing somebody to alter his life. That a person's life can never become
better  if  a  state  acts  against,  or  tries to  alter,  his conception  in  life,  is  according  to  them an
overstatement. Surely it seems common sense to say that forcing somebody to pray for a god he
doesn't believe in is not very effective.  It is however equally common sense to argue that a crack
cocaine addict who  drifts through life without meaning might be better off  when the state forces
him to change his life. People's lives, especially if we accept that they can endorse aspects of it later,
can get objectively better in some cases. Of course endorsement of one 's life is important, but it is
not the only determinant of a good life.  
5.3. final remarks
In this lengthy chapter I have discussed the argument that the autonomy of individuals requires that
the  state  is  neutral.  I  firstly  argued  that,  if  a  state  wants  to  take  the  autonomy of  individuals
seriously, more seems to be required  of it than neutrality about the conceptions of the good life.
Based  on  the  case  of  women  from traditional  social  cultures  I  concluded  that  a neutral  state
insufficiently guarantees  the autonomy of  individuals. I secondly argued that nonneutral policies
that aim to promote the autonomy of individuals do not necessarily have to be self-defeating.
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Chapter six: Conclusion
The freedom of  individuals is insufficiently protected within a state which is neutral towards the
different conceptions of the good life in society. This was the claim I set out to defend in this thesis.
I argued that I favored a theory that held that the state should promote the good and that a person's
life can be valuable independently of his own desires and judgment about it. 
I firstly argued that freedom is more than simply doing what one wants. People, who drift through
life without any guidance or without thinking for themselves, cannot be considered free. In order to
be free a person needs to be autonomous. He should live his life guided by his own values, ideals
and  goals  in  life.  These  goals,  values  and  ideals  should  be  the  result  of  a  process  of critical
reflection. This was the first criterion of a truly autonomous life. Secondly I argued that individuals
should independently form and alter  their  values,  beliefs  and goals in life.  They should not be
manipulated or coerced into having certain goals and values. Not only should an individual have a
life plan, this life plan should be his own. Thirdly I argued that an autonomous life requires a choice
between various reasonable options, which are significantly different. It is not enough if individuals
have the mental capabilities to be self-governing and are free from indoctrination and coercion, they
should also have numerous good ways of life to choose from. A person can be considered free, if
these three criteria are met.  
I  secondly discussed  the  concept  of  liberal  neutrality.  I  argued  firstly  that  liberal  neutrality  is
primarily  a  political  doctrine that  defines  the  boundaries  of  state  action.  It  however  might  be
necessary that individuals accept and act in accordance with the principles of neutrality as well, at
least when they act in the public realm. Secondly does the doctrine of neutrality entails that the state
should refrain from promoting the good in society. It can however legitimately promote the right
and have an opinion about empirical claims. I refuted the idea that the state should only refrain from
promoting controversial conceptions of the good, because this would grant the state too much and
too few power at the same time. Finally I defended the view that the doctrine of neutrality entails
that the state should justify its policies with neutral reasons. The idea that the neutral state should
guarantee that the effects of its policies are neutral between the different conceptions of the good is
simply indefensible. Neutral reasons should however be sufficiently strong. It should not be used as
an excuse to aim to promote a certain conception of the good. 
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I thirdly argued why a neutral state insufficiently guarantees the autonomy of individuals. I used the
case of women from traditional social environments to defend this claim. I firstly argued that the
argument that respect for autonomy requires that states  remain neutral about conceptions of the
good was indefensible. On the contrary, neutral states fail to respect the autonomy of individuals,
especially  that  of women from traditional  societies.  Neutral  states insufficiently  guarantee  that
people can critically reflect on their options, they are incapable of defending them from illegitimate
manipulation  and  they cannot  secure  enough reasonable  options  for  them.  In a  neutral  society
individuals  are  left  on their  own and if  a  state  truly wants  to  respect  their  autonomy more  is
required. It requires policies which promote an autonomous way of life. 
I lastly discussed a powerful objection to the idea that an autonomous way of life can be promoted.
I discussed the so-named endorsement constraint, which holds that a person's life cannot be become
better or good without the endorsement of this person. It is ineffective to force somebody to pray for
a god he doesn't believe in. A truly good life is lived from the inside of a person and thus cannot be
forced upon him through means of coercion. A state should therefore remain neutral. 
I argued that the endorsement constraint is very plausible. Especially promoting autonomy through
means of coercion is evidently self-defeating. A state cannot force somebody to be self-governing
and  independent.  If  a  state  enacts  policies  which  aim to  do  so,  these  policies  would  be  self-
defeating. I  am however critical  about the claim that the state does  thus needs to  remain neutral.
There are  many noncoercive means  at the disposal  of states which can foster and promote the
autonomy of individuals. A state can educate them in the different ways of life in society. It could
also teach them to be independent and to critically reflect on their  goals and values in life. It can
stimulate valuable ways of life and can provide an adequate plurality of valuable options. Also in
some case can an initial coercion of individuals become valuable if the enforced individuals endorse
the value of the imposed way of life later. This possibility of later endorsement opens the door for
all kinds of coercive policies which  could safeguard the autonomy of people later  in their lives.
Whether such policies are desirable is another question, but it shows that the endorsement constraint
doesn't force us to the conclusion that a state should be neutral. 
A state  should  therefore  not  be neutral  if  it  wants  to  respect  and to  promote the  autonomy of
individuals.  I  hope that  I have  defended this  claim sufficiently in  this  thesis.  I  however  didn't
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discuss in much detail the policies that are required to promote autonomy in general and more
specifically that  of  women  from traditional  social  environments. I  think  it  will  prove  to  be  a
challenge  to  define  such  policies.  It  might  even  form  a  practical  limitation  to  possibility  of
promoting autonomy.  Secondly,  there  might  be  very  compelling  other  reasons  to  favor  state
neutrality. I only discussed a few of the possible arguments in favor of a neutral state and not with
the scrutiny and care they deserve, let alone with the scrutiny and care to rebut them. A complete
refutation  of  the  doctrine of  neutrality  would  require  this  and would  be an  enormous  difficult
challenge.  This thesis is but a modest contribution to this  task. I however hope to have  showed
convincingly that a truly free life consists in more than simply doing what one wants and therefore
that a state should do more than simply providing the opportunity to do so. 
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